'Signs of churning': Muslim Personal Law and public contestation in twenty-first century India by Jones, Justin
Modern Asian Studies
http://journals.cambridge.org/ASS
Additional services for Modern Asian Studies:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
‘Signs of churning’: Muslim Personal Law and 
public contestation in twenty­ﬁrst century India
JUSTIN JONES
Modern Asian Studies / Volume 44 / Special Issue 01 / January 2010, pp 175 ­ 200
DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X09990114, Published online: 15 December 2009
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0026749X09990114
How to cite this article:
JUSTIN JONES (2010). ‘Signs of churning’: Muslim Personal Law and public 
contestation in twenty­ﬁrst century India. Modern Asian Studies, 44, pp 175­200 
doi:10.1017/S0026749X09990114
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/ASS, IP address: 144.173.6.37 on 25 Feb 2013
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2013 IP address: 144.173.6.37
Modern Asian Studies 44, 1 (2010) pp. 175–200. C© Cambridge University Press 2009
doi:10.1017/S0026749X09990114
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and public contestation in twenty-first
century India∗
JUSTIN JONES
Department of History, Exeter University
EX4 4RJ, United Kingdom
Email: j.r.jones@exeter.ac.uk
Abstract
For many Muslims, the preservation of Muslim Personal Law has become the
touchstone of their capacity to defend their religious identity in modern India.
This paper examines public debate over Muslim Personal Law, not as a site of
consensus within the community, but rather as an arena in which a varied array
of Muslim individuals, schools and organisations have sought to assert their own
distinctiveness. This is done by discussing the evolution of the All India Muslim
Personal Law Board, the most influential organisation to speak on such matters
since the 1970s, with particular focus on its recent disintegration at the hands
of a number of alternative legal councils formed by feminist, clerical and other
groups. These organisations have justified their existence through criticism of
the organisation’s alleged attempts to standardise Islamic law, and its perceived
dominance by the Deobandi school of thought. In truth, however, this process
of fragmentation results from a complex array of embryonic and interlinked
personal, political and ideological competitions, indicative of the increasingly
fraught process of consensus-building in contemporary Indian Muslim society.
Muslim personal laws and postcolonial identities
In a brief twelve-month period spanning 2004 and 2005, several
protracted episodes of argument and contestation took place between
∗ This paper is based upon newspaper materials collected in India between 2004
and 2007, and on publications issued by the various shari‘at -councils discussed
within. For facilitating my access to documentation, I owe thanks to Maulana Mirza
MuhammadAthar,MaulanaNaeemur-Rehman, andKazimZaheer, and to the offices
of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (Delhi), the All India Shia Personal
Law Board, and the Nadva‘t ul-‘Ulama Madrasa (both Lucknow). For their insightful
suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Nandini Chatterjee,
Humeira Iqtidar, Werner Menski and Eleanor Newbigin, as well as its anonymous
reviewer.
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a number of Muslim representatives, schools and organisations in
modern India. All were widely covered in the English and Urdu
presses which perhaps predictably interpreted them, despite their
particularity, as indicative of wider issues affecting the Indian Muslim
community as a whole.
The first of these episodes was the enhanced profile suddenly gained
by a number of organisations petitioning for the expansion of rights
for Indian Muslim women. These included the renewal of established
feminist groups like the Awaz-i-Niswan and the Women’s Research
and Action Group, both of Mumbai, which offered counselling and
legal advice to women experiencing marital problems or divorce
procedures.1 Others were newly created associations such as the
Muslim Women’s Forum of Delhi, the Huqooq-i-Niswah and the
Muslim Women’s Youth of India, all of which began to establish a
visible public role from around 2003. Early 2005 saw the foundation of
one of themost significant of these organisations, the All IndiaMuslim
Women’s Personal Law Board, which in its first ‘adalat (extra-judicial
court) held in the city of Lucknow registered 166 cases of women
seeking its advice on marital and divorce matters.2 This combined
array of organisations propounded a version of what has often been
called ‘Islamic feminism,’ since they represented not a ‘middle-class
secular feminism’ conveyed in a religious cloak, but actively grounded
their advocacy of the expansion of women’s rights in recourse to the
Islamic scriptures and an egalitarian interpretation of the shari‘at
(Islamic law).3
The causes taken up by these organisations were numerous, and
included ensuring the payment of maintenance to divorced women,
grantingmore rights towomen to obtain divorce or custody of children,
and protecting women from mistreatments such as dowry offences.
Most particularly, all engaged with the issue of triple-talaq—a form
1 The Awaz-i-Niswan was founded in 1987, but has gained heightened fame
and geographical reach in recent years. For a discussion of its activities, see
Sylvia Vatuk, ‘Islamic Feminism in India: Indian Muslim Women Activists and
the Reform of Muslim Personal Law’, Modern Asian Studies (2008) 42–2/3: 497–
499. The Women’s Research and Action Group was founded in 1993 to speak for,
in the organisation’s own words, women who were ‘subordinated by the politics
of gender, identity and personal laws.’ Yoginder Sikand, ‘Listen to the Women’,
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?227300 [posted 5May, 2005].
2 The Pioneer (Lucknow), 3 February, 2005; The Indian Express (Lucknow), 3
February, 2005; The Hindu (Delhi), 27 February, 2005; Vatuk, ‘Islamic Feminism
in India’ (2008): 505–507.
3 Yoginder Sikand, ‘Listen to the Women’, passim; Vatuk, ‘Islamic Feminism in
India’, passim.
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of divorce enacted by verbal pronouncement unilaterally and
instantaneously by the husband. The triple-talaq practice had long
been a subject of contentious public debate, representing for many
the excesses of the shari‘at as implemented in postcolonial India.
Yet, it elicited an enhanced level of attention in the first decade of
the twenty-first century, with stories emerging in the press of men
using the telephone, email or even mobile telephone text messages
to divorce their wives.4 Much of the blame for the existence of this
and other comparable practices was assigned to the established ‘ulama
(Muslim clergy), especially those gathered in a body known as the All
India Muslim Personal Law Board (henceforth AIMPLB). They were
widely accused by Islamic feminists of fostering incorrect readings of
particular injunctions of shari‘at, and using them to perpetuate the
denigration of women and suppression of their essential rights.
The second development in question was the formation of several
new organisations and councils of Muslim ‘ulama seeking to express
their own interpretations of the shari‘at. While until 2004 the AIMPLB
had been largely unrivalled as the dominant public forum for the
discussion of such matters, now its hegemony over these issues
was undermined by the attempted breakaway of several religious
schools within Islam seeking to express their own autonomy of legal
interpretation and leadership. In November 2004, Tauqeer Reza
Khan of the Barelvi school of Sunni Islam deserted the AIMPLB
to establish a separate and somewhat makeshift organisation known
as the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (Jadid), representing
a partial split from the original AIMPLB of one of the largest
subdivisions with Indian Sunni Islam.5 Just two months later, and no
doubt spurred by the former, a number of Shia ‘ulama of Lucknow and
Hyderabad pledged to found an organisation known as the All India
Shia Personal Law Board. It ultimately came into being later in 2005
under the stewardship of Mirza Muhammad Athar, a populist Shia
preacher from outside Lucknow’s main clerical establishment.6 The
decision to form this organisation coincided with a series of violent
clashes between Sunni and Shia Muslims in Lucknow during the 2005
Muharram festival, and the press widely held the formation of the
4 For one example of the latter, see the case of Sahaba Khaliq of Moradabad. Times
of India (Lucknow), 21 November, 2005; Qaumi Khabren (Lucknow), 22 November,
2005.
5 The Indian Express, 24 January, 2005.
6 Raport: Aal Indiya Shia Parsanal Laa Bord (Lucknow, 2005), pp. 1–4; The Yam Times
(Hyderabad), 19 November, 2005.
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new Shia Board and its fierce defiance of the AIMPLB to be one of the
causative factors.7
A few months later, a third incident of importance occurred on
the other side of Uttar Pradesh in the small town of Charthawal
near Muzaffarnagar. In June 2005, a controversy erupted in this town
around the alleged rape of a married Muslim woman, Imrana, by
her father-in-law. In response, a panchayat (local council) of ‘ulama
and representatives of her ansari caste was convened to decide an
appropriate response, declaring that she should leave her husband.
Following Imrana’s refusal to comply, opinion on the issue was
requested from the nearby madrasa of Deoband, which issued an edict
confirming the opinion that her marriage should be considered void.8
The verdict managed in one swoop to infuriate a vocal combination of
the press, Islamic feminist organisations, the state government, and
indeed the AIMPLB, the latter of whom mobilised to issue a counter-
edict that the matter was a question for the criminal code rather
than Muslim Personal Law and hence should be referred to the state
courts.9
While none of these episodes is directly connected with another,
many commentators were quick to note the impressions of linkage
between them. They remarked on such events collectively as signs of a
broadly conceived ‘churning process’ within Indian Islam,10 effectively
a series of intertwined efforts to renovate structures of Muslim reli-
gious leadership and modes of legal understanding, with wide-ranging
social and political ramifications. As encapsulated by the elements
described above, this churning process has been primarily manifested
through a series of very public arguments which relate in different
ways to questions concerning the derivation and implementation of
Muslim Personal Law (henceforth MPL), a subject which is at the
heart of this paper and therefore needs some brief introduction.
7 Qaumi Khabren, 22 and 25 February, 2005.
8 The Milli Gazette (Delhi), 16–31 July, 2005; The Telegraph (Calcutta), 29 June,
2005. Critics of the edict said that it did not distinguish between rape and adultery.
After the issuing of the edict and the furore it generated, the rectors of Deobandmade
some effort to retract it, saying that it had expressed only a hypothetical religious
opinion and was not a fatwa intended to guide responses.
9 For more information on this widely covered and controversial case, see Barbara
Metcalf, ‘Imrana: Rape, Islam and Law in India’, in Islamic Studies (2007), 45–3:
389–412; Outlook (Delhi), 18 July, 2005; Rashtriya Sahara (Noida), 3 July, 2005.
10 TheHindu,29 January,2005. Interestingly, similar languagewas even used by the
BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/4235999.stm [posted 9
February, 2005].
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MPL, the legal system current in India which allows Muslims to be
directed by a version of religious law in personal and family matters
(marriage, divorce, guardianship, inheritance, etc.),11 has continued
to elicit a great deal of journalistic and academic attention. Some
scholars have assessed modern MPL as the successor of the colonial
systemofAnglo-MuhammadanLaw, a distinctive hybrid of a particular
understanding of shari‘at and English law grounded in an enduring
policy of state ‘non-interference’ in religious affairs.12 A large number
of other studies have focused upon the political or constitutional
ramifications of MPL, assessing the implications of religiously-derived
systems of personal laws for the modern meanings of secularism and
the attitudes of the state towards its religious minorities.13 But in
particular, a large body of literature has discussed how an Indian
Muslim identity has been cultivated around a historical trajectory
which has conflated the Muslim community with its distinctive legal
status.14 Such a notion began to crystallise during the colonial period
when, according to one author, the collapse of Muslim political power
incurred Muslim leaders to ‘turn . . . increasingly to “law” as the sole
pillar of their community,’ or more specifically, Anglo-Muhammadan
law, that particular rendition of shari‘at cultivated through colonial
court activity.15
Thereafter, a comparable discourse of Muslim identity has arguably
continued to exist into the postcolonial period, with personal laws
being similarly reified as the terrain upon which a distinctive Muslim
identity can be preserved in spite of the community’s numerical and
political frailty. Like religious freedoms, the protection of Urdu, the
distinctive status of Aligarh University, and so on, the preservation
of MPL has become part of a ‘symbolic vocabulary’ of issues which
11 Muslim Personal Law is a legal system based upon the presumption thatMuslims
should be governed in their personal and family affairs by a formof religious law, which
can be administered in family courts. It exists both in statutory form (enshrined in
statutes such as the Muslim Personal Law [Shari‘at] Application Act of 1937 and the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939) and in case law, working on the basis
of court precedent.
12 For example, Rina VermaWilliams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial
Legal Legacies and the Indian State (Oxford: Delhi, 2006), passim.
13 For example, Gerald James Larson, ed., Religion and Personal Law in Secular India:
a Call to Judgment (Social Science Press: Delhi, 2001), passim.
14 For reflection upon such themes, see Gail Minault, ‘Women, Legal Reform
and Muslim Identity in South Asia’, http://www.juragentium.unifi.it/en/surveys/rol/
minault.htm [posted 2005].
15 Scott Alan Kugle, ‘Framed, Blamed and Renamed: the Recasting of Islamic
Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies (2001), 35–2: 302.
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have come to represent the Muslim minority itself, a representational
language perpetuated both by the state and by Muslim community
leaders alike.16
Thus, studies of colonial and postcolonial settings have consistently
been in agreement in situating the issue of the integrity of personal
laws at the core of Indian Muslim identity politics. A further
implication of this conflation of the Muslim community with its
personal laws, of course, is its identification of the personal/private
realmof individual and family transactions (known asma‘malat), rather
than the public/political realms, as the natural core ground of the
shari‘at.17 This assumption underlay the colonial administration of
Anglo-Muhammadan Law, and it has in effect been perpetuated into
the postcolonial present by the language of both government and
Muslim organisations, both of which have frequently articulated legal
autonomy in the private sphere as an allegedmeans of accommodating
the needs of the Muslim community within the modern secular state.
Many such analyses, however, have conveyed the impression of
the successful confluence of a singular Muslim opinion around the
issue of MPL. By primarily framing debates on MPL as discussions
taking place between representatives of India’s Muslim minority
and an outside ‘other’ (be this the colonial or postcolonial state, or
the Hindu majority), such studies unintentionally risk implying a
somewhat homogenisedMuslimpublic opinion, singular in perspective
on personal laws and united in pursuing their protection.
This paper approaches the subject of MPL from the very different
viewpoint of purely inner-Muslim dialogue. It examines MPL less as
an issue around which a singular Muslim identity and policy has been
expressed and harmonised, but instead as a site in which a growing
range of Muslim voices have come to assert their individual identities
and demand their own rights to self-determination. MPL, in effect,
has become a platform for ongoing dispute and contestation within
Indian Islam itself.
The next section of this paper introduces the AIMPLB—long the
most high-profile participant in the cause of preserving MPL in India.
It assesses how andwhy the organisation has in recent years attempted
16 Zoya Hasan, ‘Minority Identity, State Policy and the Political Process’, in Zoya
Hasan, ed., Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State in India (Westview:
Boulder, 1994), pp. 63–65.
17 Rina Verma Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws (2006), pp. 6–7; c.f.
BrinkleyMessick,TheCalligraphic State: Textual Domination andHistory in aMuslimSociety
(California: Berkeley, 1996), pp. 61–62.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2013 IP address: 144.173.6.37
PERSONAL LAW AND PUBL IC CONTESTATION 181
to codify a more homogenous and standardised corpus of personal
laws applicable to Indian Muslims. The subsequent two sections
examine how this codification project has been contested by a growing
number of voices from within India’s notional Muslim community.
The increasingly divisive nature of dialogues on personal law matters
are located partly in the development of fresh manifestations of
longstanding maslaki (sectarian) quarrels in Indian Islam, but also in
terms of broader religious and social changes in modern India, which
have had deep ramifications for the feasibility of public spokesmanship
and representation in contemporary Muslim society.
From campaigns to codification: the changing role of the All
India Muslim Personal Law Board
Despite having been one of the most important and influential
Muslim religio-political organisations in India throughout the last
35 years, the historical development and organisational structure
of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board have received scant
detailed consideration by historians or political scientists. Too often,
and for a variety of reasons that shall be described, it has been
cursorily dismissed in academic and journalistic coverage alike as a
‘fundamentalist and conservative force’, or ‘a phalanx of orthodoxy’.18
Such views have largely been predicated on the AIMPLB’s periodic
rows with the government, legal and its association with contentious
legal practices such as male-initiated unilateral divorce. But these
perspectives also carry within them the insinuation that the AIMPLB
is a static, unflinching entity, having evolved little in purpose or
perspective since its inception. However, a broader assessment of the
Board’s historical development reveals that its activities and aims have
been subject to a constant process of amendment and modification.
With them have been carried wider public debates on the meanings
of MPL, and how it should be conceived and managed in modern
India.
The AIMPLB was initially founded by Muhammad Taiyab, the
muhtamim (director) of the famous madrasa at Deoband. An initial
congregation of ‘ulama at Deoband, followed by a larger assembly at
18 Respectively, Kirti Singh, ‘The Constitution and Muslim Personal Law’, in Zoya
Hasan, ed., Forging Identities (1994), p. 96; Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation:
India’s Muslims Since Independence (Oxford: New Delhi, 1997), pp. 311–314.
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Mumbai at the end of 1972, finally led to the formal establishment of
the Board in Hyderabad four months later. The initial trigger for its
foundation was its opposition to Union Law Minister H.R. Gokhale’s
tabling in parliament of an Adoption Bill that was seen as infringing
upon Muslim religious laws on guardianship, and hence as being the
precursor to the imposition of a Uniform Civil Code (henceforth
UCC).19 The AIMPLB took as its central aims the preservation of
MPL and the elimination of any apparent encroachment of the civil
or criminal codes in its application. The AIMPLB holds no formal
authority to determine the rulings or manner of implementation of
MPL, but its vocal stand on particular issues, wide membership and
status within a large network of eminent ‘ulama has meant that the
organisation has exerted a great deal of public influence on matters
relating to MPL and Indian Muslim society more generally.20
In its early years, the AIMPLB held a number of sessions of
relatively little impact, but it received more recognition through
its strong stand on particular issues, including its opposition to the
sterilisation campaigns of the Emergency period (a position which, it
could be argued, has exerted a sustained influence over the Board’s
intermittently apprehensive attitudes towards family-planning21).
However, its real evolution from small colloquium into pressure group
of national prominence came with the famed Shah Bano controversy
of 1985–1986. This protracted episode, infamous for its wide political
ramifications, refers to a particular divorce case which ultimately
prompted India’s Supreme Court to rule that civil maintenance laws,
allowing a divorced woman to claim maintenance indefinitely from
her former husband, could be applied to Muslims without interfering
with MPL. In response the Board, in league with other Muslim
organisations, orchestrated a major and nationwide protest against
this supposed foray by the state into the legal territory of personal laws.
Ultimately, this prompted Rajiv Gandhi’s government to overturn
19 The UCC is in official terms a Directive Principle of State Policy, outlined in
Article 44 of the IndianConstitution. The underlying argument in its support remains
that a cumbersome and regressive system of religiously-founded personal laws should
be replaced with a single, secular and standardised system of family law for all citizens.
20 For a history of the AIMPLB in its early years through its own eyes, see
Muhammad Abdul Rahim Qureshi, Aal Indiya Muslim Parsanal Laa Bord: Sargarmion
ka Ek Khake (Hyderabad, 2002).
21 Sayyid Shah Minnat-ullah Rehmani, Tanqidi Ja‘iza—Fikhri Mutali‘a: Khandani
Mansooba-Bandi (Delhi,1984), passim; Patricia Jeffery, Roger Jeffery andCraig Jeffery,
‘Disputing Contraception: Muslim Reform, Secular Change and Fertility’, Modern
Asian Studies (2008) 42–2/3: 525, 540.
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the ruling and introduce the misleadingly named ‘Muslim Women’s
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill’, exempting Muslim women
from the maintenance provisions enshrined in the civil code.22 This
decision by an embattled Congress party to assent to the demands of
the AIMPLB shows how the government itself gave credence to the
organisation’s profile and influence, thus facilitating its self-portrayal
as an authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of
India.
While the AIMPLB has been most renowned for these promi-
nent and somewhat controversial single-issue campaigns, just as
consequential have been its pastoral efforts in offering instruction
on ethics and conduct to the Muslim population more widely. In
recent years, it has published and disseminated a large number of
booklets and tracts on a wide array of issues, primarily in Urdu but
also in other South Asian languages, authored by its affiliated ‘ulama.
Many constitute a form of advice-literature, offering instruction to
the Muslim population on a range of issues of personal and family
comportment encompassing marriage, divorce, the making of wills
and procedures of inheritance.23 Other writings of the AIMPLB
appear to be efforts to reach existing functionaries such as local
‘ulama, imams andmuftis, issuing standardised suggested khutbat (Friday
sermons) and other such guidance,24 opening yet another channel of
communication with a public audience. Such activities, it could be
argued, represent an attempt, in recent years especially, to establish
a wider role in contemporary Muslim society, diffusing the AIMPLB’s
pronouncements among clergy and laity far beyond the confines of the
organisation’s offices in south-east Delhi.
On the broadest level, the AIMPLB’s ascendancy into one of India’s
most influential Muslim public bodies has reinforced the centrality of
MPL at the very heart of efforts to define and preserve a distinctive
Muslim community identity in modern India. Indeed, while critics of
the organisation have often described it as a reactionary and innovative
22 On the Shah Bano case, see especially Asghar Ali Engineer, The Shah Bano
Controversy (Sangam: London, 1987).
23 On marriage and divorce see, for example, Syed Minnat-ullah Rehmani, Nikah
aur Talaq (Hyderabad, 2007); Zaghir Ahmad Rehmani, Talaq ke Iste‘mal ka Tariqa
(Delhi, 2007). On bequests and inheritance issues, see Atiq Ahmad Bastvi, Islam ka
Nizam-i-Mirash (Lucknow, 1999); for wider compendiums of general guidance on these
and other issues, seeMujahid ul-IslamQasmi,Muslim Parsanal Laa kaMasla: Ta‘aruf aur
Tajziya (Delhi, 2000); Muhammad Barhan ul-Din Simbhali, Islah-i-Ma‘ashra (Delhi,
2007).
24 AIMPLB, Khutbat-i-Juma’ (Delhi, 2005).
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influence in Muslim society, the AIMPLB has in fact essentially
conformed to and further entrenched a discourse going back some
200 years which has conflated Muslim religious identity with the
integrity of the community’s distinctive legal status. The Board has
been an active participant in the privatisation of shari‘at discussed
above, identifying Islamic law predominantly with the conjugal and
domestic laws through which the conduct of Muslim individuals and
families can be ordered and controlled.25
One outcome of this has been an enduring preoccupation with
the role and rights of women as a key site upon which the Muslim
community itself is defined. Controlling women, whether in terms of
regulating their behaviour, determining their duties or advising on
their marital, financial or custodial rights, have consistently rested
at the heart of the AIMPLB’s attempts to order an idealised Muslim
society.26 As a wide body of literature has shown, such concerns among
Muslim reformists with women’s behaviour have a long history tracing
back to the colonial period. Whether on account of the widening of
ethics of personal responsibility, the expansion of the public sphere or
the focus on the domestic arena as the centre of cultural resilience,
it has generally been agreed that women were increasingly perceived
as emblematic of the wider community of faith, and actively sharing
in the burdensome task of its reform.27 By extension, matters such
as the behaviour of women or the rights afforded to them were
reconstituted as pivotal issues in the definition and ordering ofMuslim
society. The recent activities of the AIMPLB therefore illustrate how
an understanding dating from the colonial period of Muslim women
as key symbols for defining wider ideals of Islamic behaviour has been
perpetuated into the present.
Beneath these broader implications of the AIMPLB for the way in
which Muslim identity in postcolonial India has been conceived and
articulated, it is equally important to consider the recent shifts in its
25 While its writings occasionally point out that personal law (‘a‘ili nizam)
constitutes only a part of a wider shari‘at with wide civil, criminal and political
applications, in practice the AIMPLB uses the vocabulary of personal laws and shari‘at
virtually synonymously.
26 For texts on the rights of women and their correct behaviour published by the
AIMPLB, see Muhammad Barhan ul-Din Simbhali, Iunifarm Sivil Kod, Muslim Parsanal
Laa aur ‘Aurat ke Huqooq (Lucknow, 1996); Muhammad Razi ul-Islam Nadvi, Islami
Purdah: Kya aur Kyon? (New Delhi, 1999).
27 For just two examples from a large genre, see Barbara Metcalf, ‘Reading and
WritingAboutMuslimWomen inBritish India’, inHasan, ed.,Forging Identities (1994),
pp. 1–22; Gail Minault, Secluded Scholars: Women’s Education and Muslim Social Reform in
Colonial India (Oxford: Delhi, 1998), passim.
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activities. As described above, the Board’s endeavours during its first
generation of existence, such as its responses to the Adoption Bill or
the Shah Bano case, represented a series of single-issue mobilisations.
It used these individual campaigns to communicate the inviolability
of MPL and to demarcate the boundaries of personal law jurisdiction,
but made minimal attempt to define the specific requirements of the
shari‘at or details of points of law themselves. However, in more recent
times and in marked contrast to its earlier endeavours, the Board has
come to attempt a partial codification of MPL in India, setting up
specific guidance for decision on particular legal issues and affairs.
This push by the AIMPLB for the codification of shari‘at is a novel one,
and the reasons for seeking it are in need of detailed interrogation.
Initial efforts at codification began in the aftermath of the Shah
Bano episode. These efforts were perhaps prompted by nascent factors
including the new attention conferred on MPL as an issue of public
media and political debate, the wider Hindu-isation of the state
(termed ‘bhagwa-rang’ by theAIMPLB28) and theHindu right’s renewal
of the campaign for aUCC, not tomention theAIMPLB’s own elevated
profile. Far from simply defending the principle of personal laws, the
AIMPLB now appeared to seek the reinforcement ofMPL fromwithin,
by initiating fresh moves to define the nature of shari‘at and its means
of functioning. In 1989, while public memory of the Shah Bano fracas
was still fresh, a council affiliated to the AIMPLB known as the Fiqhi
Academy was founded by Mujahid al-Islam Qasimi (subsequently a
president of theAIMPLB)with the aim of forming consensual opinions
among Indian ‘ulama on particular points of Islamic law.29 As would
often be the case with those seeking to mould the specific details of
the shari‘at, the focus fell especially on negotiating tenets of marriage
and divorce laws. It was this that ultimately paved the way for the
issuing of a standardised nikahnama (contract of marriage) by the
AIMPLB in 1999–2000, which could be interpreted as an attempt
to engrain a new level of uniformity and standardisation not simply
into the marriage contract itself but also into associated behaviours
such as dowry matters, divorce, custody of children and the rights of
the wife.30
28 AIMPLB, Majmu‘a-i-Qawanen-i-Islami: Muslim Parsanal Laa se Muta‘liq Ehkam-i-
Shari‘at-i-Islami ka Dafa’ Var Murattab Mujmu‘a (reprint: New Delhi, 2007), pp. 27–31.
29 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia
(Oneworld: Oxford, 2008), p. 112.
30 See http://www.aimplboard.org/madaris.html#nikahnama [last accessed 24
July, 2008].
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Yet perhaps the most striking manifestation of the codification
project was the publication in 2001 of a large volume entitledMajmu‘a-
i-Qawanen-i-Islami (‘A Compendium of Islamic Laws’), compiled by a
number of clerics affiliated to the AIMPLB. In stark contrast with
the Board’s earlier and more piecemeal publications, the work was
intended to offer complete and absolute guidance on an exhaustive
list of subjects related to personal or family transactions as diverse
as marriage, dowry, custody, various forms of divorce, gifts, bequests,
inheritance, and religious endowments.31 The sources used included
original Arabic scriptures such as the Qur‘an and Traditions (hadis),
but also incorporated later interpretative legal works from famed
Indian jurisprudents of recent centuries such as Abdul Hai Firangi
Mahali, Aziz ul-Rehman Usmani and Ashraf Ali Thanawi.32 As such,
the work staked claim to offering a full and distinctly South Asian
digest of Islamic Law, condensing and synthesizing the opinions of
original scriptures with later legal interpretations. The AIMPLB’s
professed aim for the Compendium was that it would be used as a
guide by lawyers and judges, and thus influence decisions made in
family courts.33 Equally, we assume, it was intended to effect some
influence upon a varied array of unofficial bodies such as the offices
of qazis, shari‘at courts, local panchayats and baradari (kinship) councils
which in reality continue to handle a large bulk of Muslim family
disputes in contemporary India.34
The AIMPLB’s modern strivings towards codification have tended
to further criticisms propounded about the Board by its detractors.35
Some, for instance, have viewed the AIMPLB’s combative justification
of the need for codification, as a necessary response to the encro-
achment of a UCC, as evidence of its own belief in the inherent
incompatibility of Islamic and civil legal systems and their inability
to share any point of contact. Certainly many of the Board’s published
writings, those that communicate the meanings of MPL and its
31 AIMPLB, Majmu‘a-i-Qawanen-i-Islami (2007), passim.
32 For a comprehensive list of the sources used, see ibid, pp. 23–26.
33 Ibid, p. 18.
34 On this informal structure for implementing religious personal laws, see Sylvia
Vatuk, ‘“Where Will She Go? What Will She Do?” Paternalism Toward Women in
the Administration of Muslim Personal Law in Contemporary India’, in Larson, ed.,
Religion and Personal Law (2001), pp. 232, 240.
35 Some of the most notable criticisms of the Board from an academic perspective
are the various internet-published articles by Yoginder Sikand, many of which are
cited in this paper.
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contemporary importance to Indian Muslims, do imply the clear
bifurcation of religious and civil law, and place MPL in unambiguous
and clear opposition to any notion of a UCC.36 Other observers have
perceived the AIMPLB, as exemplified especially by its Compendium,
as attempting to impose a rigid, unreformed and regressive version of
shari‘at, drawn from antiquated legal texts and insensitive to changing
attitudes and the customary diversities of Indian Muslim society. One
author, for instance, has described these efforts as conflating ‘fiqh’, the
various methods of Islamic jurisprudence, and ‘shari‘at’, the normative
code of law itself.37 In other words, the many interpretative tools
available to the ‘ulama to synthesise Islamic ideals with evolving social
realities have been replaced by a uniform corpus of law which is
singular, absolute and immutable. This argument, of course, takes
the process of legal codification to be akin to rigidifying and ossifying
the shari‘at, and it is this interpretation which has dominated many
studies of the standardisation of Muslim personal laws in India.38
Such beliefs that the process of codification of shari‘at represents a
consolidation of traditionalism or an impediment to modernisation,
however, remain somewhat simplistic. Indeed, such views are
contradicted by the AIMPLB’s appropriation of reformist opinion on
particular decisions. One example will here suffice: its inclusion of
directives stipulating conditions in which a woman may seek divorce.
Importantly, the Compendium grants Muslim women several grounds
for initiating divorce, among them the cruelty, insanity, impotence,
imprisonment or disappearance of the husband.39 The origins of these
directives lie in a formulation of 1932–1933 by the highly influential
cleric, Ashraf Ali Thanawi, which was thereafter institutionalised
in state legislation by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act
(DMMA) of 1939—the last piece of major social legislation enacted
36 Examples include Syed Shah Minnat-ullah Rehmani, Iunifarm Sivil Kod (Delhi,
undated); Muhammad Abdul Rahim Qureshi, Dastoor-i-Hind aur Iunifarm Sivil Kod
(Delhi, 2007).
37 Yoginder Sikand, ‘The Fyzee Formula’, http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?
fodname=20040705&fname=yogi&sid=1 [posted 5 July, 2004]; Yoginder Sikand,
‘Patriarchy and Sectarianism: Explaining the Dissensions in the All IndiaMuslim Per-
sonal Law Board’, http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%
5D=x-157–119978 [posted 11 February, 2005].
38 Scott Alan Kugle, among others, has argued that the British preference for text-
based pronouncements, and their subjugation of the interpretative role of Muslim
jurists, engrained a greater degree of rigidity in personal laws and inflexibility in
their implementation. Kugle, ‘Framed, Blamed and Renamed’ (2001): 297–300.
39 AIMPLB, Majmu‘a-i-Qawanen-i-Islami (2007), p. 237.
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by the colonial state.40 This example suggests, however quietly,
that the codification of MPL, while conducted in the language of
the immutability of shari‘at and justified through recourse to hadis
literature, has entailed the appropriation of Islamic jurisprudence
contemporary to the twentieth century.
Additionally, this example contradicts the notion that the AIMPLB
has long backed a position of resistance to, rather than cooperation
with, the civil code. It is true that the AIMPLB has verbally justified
codification as a means of reinforcing MPL against directives towards
a UCC, implying the shoring up of boundaries between civil law and
shari‘at. But the fact that the Board’s Compendium has incorporated
a major piece of state-led social legislation, in the form of the DMMA,
instead suggests a partial accommodation between these allegedly
polarised ‘Islamic’ and ‘civil’ legal systems.
Indeed, as noted above, the process of codification was intended
to provide an easily distilled compendium of shari‘at suitable for
accessible and convenient consultation within the structures of state
courts. It could thus be argued that we should not see the AIMPLB’s
codification project as simply an effort to bolster traditionalism or
resist reform; rather, it constitutes an attempt at rationalising and
modernising the shari‘at, facilitating its implementation within a legal
and structural framework set by the state.41 Indeed, even some ‘liberal’
commentators have long argued in favour of the establishment of an
authoritative code of MPL as a means of modernising the shari‘at and
attuning the workings of personal laws to the realities of the modern
legal machinery through which they are implemented. According
to such interpretations, a partial codification of personal laws by
respected clerics would streamline the making of court decisions on
40 The work in question was ‘Al-Haila‘t al-Najiza li’l-Halilat al-‘Ajiza, a long fatwa
intended to offer more means to Muslim women to escape oppressive marriages, and
it was on account of a combination of Thanawi’s endeavours and British interventions
into religious laws that such provisions were included in the DMMA. For more
information, see Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Al-Haila‘t al-Najiza Ya‘ni Mazloom-i-‘Auraton ki
Muskilat ka Shari’e-hal (reprint: Delhi, 2006); Rohit De, ‘Mumtaz Bibi’s Broken Heart:
The Many Lives of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage’s Act’, in Indian Economic and
SocialHistory Review (2009),46–1:115–118; GailMinault, ‘Women, Legal Reformand
Muslim Identity’ [2005]; Zaman, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (2008), pp. 62–5. The Majmu‘a
itself, and members and writings of the AIMPLB all reference Al-Haila‘t al-Najiza
liberally, such has been its influence upon the Board’s stipulations on divorce law.
41 For an example from another context of the codification of shari‘at as a precursor
to its smooth implementation in state courts, seeMessick,TheCalligraphicState (1996),
pp. 54–55.
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personal law matters and boost their public legitimacy.42 Similarly, it
would guard against the initiation of future argument between the
Muslim clergy and state courts, as was seen most prominently in
1985–1986, and in other cases against the issuing of arbitrary and
often controversial diktats and fatwas in defiance of court jurisdiction,
as exemplified by the Deobandi fatwa in the Imrana case some two
decades later.
It is therefore clear that characterisations of the AIMPLB as an
intransigent, reactionary and conservative entity have underestimated
the extent to which the organisation has attempted to engage
government and Muslim society on various levels, and to which
its activities have evolved in its 30 years of existence. In effect,
this elementary analysis demonstrates that in recent years the
AIMPLB has found itself engaged in two simultaneous and somewhat
contradictory activities. On the one hand, its recent efforts to codify
a workable and consistent system of MPL represent part of an
attempted modernisation and rationalisation of shari‘at. Contrary to
lines of criticism frequently used against the AIMPLB, this process
of codification reveals moves to engrain some contextual adaptability
of legal interpretation, and to pinpoint areas of dialogue between
religious law and modern civil legislation. On the other hand, the
Board’s twin needs of asserting its public relevance and placing itself
in opposition to a UCC have compelled it to speak publicly in a
somewhat emblematic language which implies the polarisation of
civil and Islamic law as binary opposites. The AIMPLB’s attempts
to balance this fragile double-language, at once finding avenues of
compromise with the state’s legal structures, and at the same time
defining the shari‘at as a timeless, immutable and text-based entity,
have placed the organisation in recent years under increasing strain,
not least from many within the notional Muslim community that it so
often evokes and aspires to represent.
Muslim Personal Law and the ‘Deobandisation’ of Indian Islam?
The AIMPLB’s recent efforts to codify a singular version of shari‘at
raise the resulting and important question of how the attempted
consolidation of a standardised legal code relates to the religious and
42 Anees Ahmed, ‘Reforming Muslim Personal Law’, Economic and Political Weekly,
24 February, 2001, pp. 618–619.
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doctrinal distinctions within Indian Islam. At least in rhetoric, the
AIMPLB has been consistently at pains to encompass these diversities.
After its foundation, it quickly developed an organisational structure
designed to reflect its inclusive approach, its regulations stating that
its 201 members should comprise ‘all the sects and organisations
of Indian Muslims’.43 Balancing its powers carefully between an
executive committee and general body, the organisation was careful
to ‘keep all the sects of Islam and the country in mind’, maintaining
a series of posts of equal seniority and as such tacitly reserving space
for female clergy (25members), Shias, Khojas and representatives of
all major Sunni legal schools.44
Indeed, as far as can be ascertained, upon its foundation the
AIMPLB received substantial support from Muslim representatives
across sectarian and doctrinal boundaries. To take just one example,
Sayyid Ali Naqi, the senior-most cleric of India’s Shiaminority, offered
a series of public sermons during the Shia Muharram festival in the
year after the AIMPLB’s formation based around the theme of the
‘immutable’ (na qabil tabdil) essence of MPL. Having attended its
founding session, he described how ‘such a gathering from so many
schools of thought and factions was an amazing experience,’ noting
with some wit the presence of an array of schools including Shias,
Barelvi Sunnis and Wahhabis who in other contexts ‘call each other
disbelievers and cannot even look at each other’s faces, all standing
together and gathered in one place’.45
However, as in recent years the AIMPLB has moved beyond merely
voicing opposition to encroachments on MPL, and attempted instead
to articulate specific provisions of shari‘at, it has perhaps inevitably
struggled to remain inclusive and representative of these manifold
diversities. Specifically, it has fallen prey to the frequent accusation
that it propounds one particular interpretation of Islam: that of the
reform movement of Deoband. The Deobandi movement, centred
upon its first madrasa established in western Uttar Pradesh in 1867,
is known primarily for its wide propagation of scriptural Islamic
knowledge and its revitalisation of scholarship in the Islamic sciences
according to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam.46 By its detractors, it
43 For this information on the AIMPLB’s structure and stated intentions, see the
organisation’s website: http://www.aimplboard.org [last accessed: 24 July, 2008].
44 Ibid.
45 Sayyid Ali Naqi, Muslim Parsanal Laa, Na Qabil Tabdil (Lucknow, 1972–3), p. 14.
46 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (Oxford:
New Delhi, 1982), passim.
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is associated with a strong opposition towards anything regarded as
‘customary’ practice (‘urf ), and patriarchal attitudes towards women.
And while the AIMPLB has sought to include a broad range of
representatives and to distance itself from any particular legal school,
the perception that the body is heavily informed personally and
intellectually by Deoband has been enduring among its detractors.47
How valid is this link frequently made between the AIMPLB and
the Deobandi reform movement? It is true that the Board’s Majmu‘a
has primarily sourced Hanafi texts, admitting in its introduction that
it gives little formal space to works from other Islamic legal schools.48
However, the argument that the AIMPLB propounds a distinctly
Deobandi interpretation of shari‘at is a fraught one. Indeed, it could
be convincingly argued that on certain issues, especially its verdicts
on a woman’s right to obtaining a divorce, the Board has borrowed
indirectly from the Maliki school of jurisprudence, one associated
primarily with north African rather than South Asian Sunni Islam.49
This example hints instead at a borrowing from and adaptation
of other legal systems on particular issues (sometimes known as
takhayyur) within theCompendium, rather than a stringent submission
to one dominant school of thought.
However, the AIMPLB might be more justly tied to Deoband on
the basis of its strong personal and institutional ties with the school.
It was in Deoband that the decision to form the organisation was
first made, and a quick review of the biographies of its presidents
and secretaries reveals that a majority spent some time in Deoband,
whether as students or as teachers. Indeed, some of its founders and
highest profile members have been descendants of the landed gentry-
families who first established the madrasa at Deoband in the 1860s.50
The inference to be made here is that the AIMPLB has come to
absorb anxietieswidespread amongmanyMuslims at the perception of
what one scholar has described as a ‘Deobandisation’ ofmodern Indian
47 For example, Raport: Aal Indiya Shia Parsanal Laa Bord (2005), pp. 1–2.
48 AIMPLB, Majmu‘a-i-Qawanen-i-Islami (2007), p. 24.
49 It was Maliki rather than Hanafi jurisprudence to which Ashraf Ali Thanawi had
turned on these issues in the 1930s, and that was institutionalised in the DMMA, and
henceforth the AIMPLB’s rulings. See above, footnote 40.
50 Muhammad Taiyab (AIMPLB president 1973–1983) originated from the
distinguished Nanautawi family of Deobandi ‘ulama, had been a student of Deoband
andwas themadrasa’s director for 58 years. Its third and fourth presidents, respectively
Mujahid ul-IslamQasmi (2000–2002) andMuhammadRabiHasni (since 2002), both
received education in Deoband, as did both of the AIMPLB’s General Secretaries to-
date.
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Islam.51 According to this argument, Deobandi norms and ideology
have increasingly come to dominate in contemporary Muslim society,
on account of the formation of numerous Deobandi madrasas, the
consolidation of Deobandi norms in urban arenas, and the suitability
of its creed of personal accountability to modern lifestyles.52 Fears
of Deobandi precedence may also have other roots, among them the
consistent dominance of Deobandi ‘ulama in campaigns of Muslim
religious and political reform since the 1920s,53 or the increased
profile of political forms of Deobandism across India’s borders in
Pakistan and Afghanistan.54 In this sense, the AIMPLB has been
construed as a component of a manifold Deobandi dominance in
Muslim public life, one going back some eighty years but particularly
acute in recent decades.
At the same time, the perception of the AIMPLB as aDeobandi body
may have much to do with the way it has evoked the standard of MPL.
Aswas demonstrated in the previous section, the organisation, albeit in
a modest way, has attempted through its Compendium to consolidate
legal space in which shari‘at could be accommodated with Indian social
norms and civil law on certain issues. Yet, its simultaneous need to
convey its cause in readily communicable terms has led the AIMPLB
to vocally reify MPL as an inviolable and text-based entity. It has
articulated MPL in opposition both to civil law and ‘native’ Indian
customary practice, arguing that neither must be allowed to impact
upon it. Indeed, some of the organisation’s published tracts convey
a combative relationship between an authenticated, Arabic-medium
51 Arshad Alam, ‘From Custom to Scripture: Observations on the Direction of
Indian Islam’, in Mushirul Hasan, ed., Living with Secularism: the Destiny of India’s
Muslims (Manohar: New Delhi, 2007), p. 190.
52 Ibid, pp. 178–90.
53 Examples include the predominance of Deobandi ‘ulama in the later stages of the
Khilafat movement; the campaigns of the Jami‘at ul-‘Ulama-i-Hind, an organisation
of Indian ‘ulama which was overwhelmingly Deobandi in its membership; and the
prominence of Deobandis on both sides of the debates around the creation of Pakistan.
For example, Zia ul Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan
(Asia Publishing House: New York, 1963); Yohanan Friedmann, ‘The Attitude of the
Jam‘iyyat al-‘Ulama’-i-Hind to the Indian National Movement and the Establishment
of Pakistan’, Asian and African Studies (1971), 7: 157–181.
54 Sana Haroon, ‘The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province
and its Implications in Colonial India and Pakistan, 1914–1996’, Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society (2008), 18–1: 47–70; S.V.R. Nasr, ‘The Rise of Sunni Militancy in
Pakistan: the Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics’,
Modern Asian Studies (2000), 34–1: 139–180.
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Islamic shari‘at and pollutive native custom.55 Such language, which
somewhat belies the quieter efforts made by the AIMPLB in favour of
accommodation, is resonant of that of which Deoband is often accused
by its opponents.
The result of this is that, whatever its efforts to maintain a
consensual and inclusive approach, Muslim individuals and bodies
hostile to the AIMPLB have labelled the organisation as a participant
in a wider and maligned consolidation of Deobandi influence within
Islamic society. The perceived Deobandi specificity of the AIMPLB
underlies the creation of those several new parallel law boards
described at the beginning of this paper, all of which were established
to contradict the Board’s claims to hegemony over personal law
issues. The Shia Personal Law Board, the Barelvi equivalent and
the All India Women’s Personal Law Board all emerged as if in a
synchronised manner within a rapid three-month period spanning
the years 2004 and 2005. Further illustrating this somewhat farcical
compartmentalisation of spokesmanship on Muslim marriage and
divorce law, the ShiaWomen’s Personal LawBoard emerged justweeks
later.56 All have cast the AIMPLB as a puritanical Sunni or Deobandi
organisationhostile tomodernisation, sometimes even implying (quite
tenuously) the existence of its ideological links with Sunni Islamist
extremism.57
An additional line of attack shared by these various councils against
the AIMPLB has been its alleged hostility to women’s rights, as
enshrined in its legislation on marriage and divorce within the
Compendium and standardised nikahnama. In particular, several of
these groups have challenged the Board’s perspective on women’s
rights to obtaining divorce. Predictably this was the case with Islamic
feminist organisations, in particular the new Women’s Personal Law
Board, whosemain accomplishment was to formulate a new nikahnama,
one which endeavoured to protect women from talaq and dowry
55 Some of the Board’s publications guard against so-called ‘excessively customary
practice’ in Islam. For example, Ubaidullah Asadi, Taqribat ka Len-Den aur us ke Mufasid
(Delhi, 2004), passim.
56 The Hindu, 6 February, 2005.
57 One of the most pronounced subjects addressed in the early sessions of the Shia
Personal Law Board was its frequent condemnation of Islamic terrorism, cited as a
major issue of difference between Shias and radical Sunnis. For example, Raport: Aal
Indiya Shia Parsanal Laa Bord (2005), p. 14; Nauroz (Lucknow), 18 November, 2005.
This was used as part of the justification for the Shia Board’s existence, as a tacit
allusion to the subversive character of the AIMPLB, and as a means of gaining a
sympathetic ear from the state and media.
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offences and to afford them more rights than the AIMPLB’s existing
equivalent.58 Perhaps even more significant was that various clerical
groups similarly focused upon issues of women’s rights as a means
of justifying their existence. One of the first actions of the Shia
Personal Law Board was to declare that triple-talaq as understood
by the AIMPLB was forbidden according to Shia jurisprudence, and to
issue an alternative nikahnama which was generally seen as providing
women with more marital rights. Even many liberal commentators
lauded this as an encouraging egalitarian move on the part of the Shia
clergy, and one that should be heeded by other Muslim schools.59
The AIMPLB’s attempts to pre-empt these criticisms actually came
to assist further in its own disintegration. Before the spate of parallel
law boards were officially formed, the combined attacks upon the
AIMPLB for its alleged hostility towards women’s rights prompted
the organisation to reconsider afresh its rulings on triple-talaq in its
2004 session.60 However, the Board’s attempt to effect a compromise,
reasserting that triple-talaq was inadvisable in practice but must
remain technically legal, seemed to please no-one. In fact, it was
this declaration that pushed certain Barelvi clerics to form their own
separate organisation, holding to a stand of the legal validity of triple-
talaq and so allowing them to claim to be truer defenders of authentic
personal laws than even the AIMPLB itself.61
What this perhaps surprisingly indicates is that many of these
parallel councils of ‘ulama have all borrowed extensively from a
discourse of the emancipation of Muslim women. This appropriation
by Muslim clerical groups of an avowedly secular or liberal rhetoric of
human rights contradicts much scholarship which has seen the ‘ulama
as inherently disinterested in such issues, or even openly hostile to
them. It also contrasts with a body of literature which has tended to
imply a clear separation of Muslim religious contestations, revolving
around ritual and theological controversies, and movements for
women’s liberalisation in Islam, which have tended to transcend such
58 The organisation was described as a ‘joke’ by the AIMPLB, who claimed that its
members should have tried to work within the AIMPLB’s remit to address such issues
rather than breaking away from it. The Hindu, 27 February, 2005.
59 ‘Rights for Shia Women’, editorial, Economic and Political Weekly, 2 December,
2006, p. 4928.
60 Sikand, ‘The Fyzee Formula’ (2004).
61 Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘AbolishingTriple Talaq:WhatNext?’,Economic and Political
Weekly, 10 July, 2004, pp. 3093–3094.
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divisions.62 By contrast, these events suggest that this discourse on
the rights afforded to women has recently become a key, and perhaps
surprising, site of contestation between different Islamic schools.
As such, the last few years have seen perhaps unprecedented flux
within debate over MPL in India. The AIMPLB’s novel efforts to
initiate a codification of personal laws have been accompanied by
allegations of the organisation’s Deobandi dominance, and clerical
representatives and Islamic feminists alike have aspired to undermine
the body through the formation of their own alternative legal
organisations. Furthermore, these desertions from the AIMPLB came
to stoke existing tensions within the organisation itself. Perhaps the
final embarrassment to the AIMPLB came just a few months later,
with the Imrana episode discussed at the beginning of this paper.
The incident created a serious and protracted internal argument,
between those members of the AIMPLB supporting the Deobandi
fatwa, those voicing disagreement, and those demanding that the
AIMPLB should take no stand in the case at all.63 In other words,
the formation of such a number of parallel legal councils ultimately
destabilised the AIMPLB, and even caused a partial rift of the Board
from Deoband, the institution often perceived to be its intellectual
inspiration. In addition, this latter estrangement further indicates
that the fragmentation of the AIMPLB cannot be solely understood as
a simple result of the ‘Deobandisation’ of its agenda. Instead, it needs
to be traced to a broader state of transition in Muslim organisational
and public life more generally in contemporary India.
Muslim Personal Law and the fragmentation of religious
authority in contemporary India
This paper has described how the All India Muslim Personal Law
Board, for some 30 years after its formation in 1972 being perhaps the
62 Work on pioneers ofMuslim women’s educational reform andmodernisation has
generally portrayed such movements as crossing sectarian boundaries in Islam rather
than working within them (e.g. Minault, Secluded Scholars (1998), passim.). Similarly,
modern Muslim women’s organisations are said to consider it ‘antithetical to their
purpose of promoting gender equality to make sectarian distinctions.’ Vatuk, ‘Islamic
Feminism in India’ (2008): 496.
63 The Telegraph, 29 June, 2005; Frontline (Lucknow), 16–29 July, 2005. The Barelvi
and Shia Boards both said that the woman should not be forced to separate from
her husband, thus distancing themselves both from Deoband and the section of the
AIMPLB that upheld this decision.
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most influential and consensual ‘Muslim’ organisation of postcolonial
India, has in recent years been the target of a series of confrontations
not simply from the secular establishment or Hindu right, but from
an amorphous and interlinked array of Islamic groups, among them
clerical councils and Islamic feminist organisations. The roots of these
changes lie in attempts by the AIMPLB to initiate a codification of
Islamic law, beginning post-Shah Bano but accelerated during the last
decade. These efforts had represented a will to formulate amore work-
able, accessible and modernised understanding of shari‘at, one better
able to function through the legal structures of the modern state. One
of their consequences, however, has been that the AIMPLB has been
widely accused of propounding an inflexible and heavily standardised
understanding of shari‘at closely bound to the Deobandi reform
movement, prompting numerous Muslim groups and councils to
criticise or separate from the Board.While the AIMPLB perhaps never
gained the full representative status among IndianMuslims towhich it
aspired, the body has nevertheless been badly damaged by this series of
challenges fromwithin the community to its legislation and legitimacy.
This paper reveals that the single issue of Muslim Personal Law has
become a site for the playing out of various factionalisms and anxieties
within Indian Islam. Indeed, insofar as the existence of MPL has come
to encapsulate and represent the condition of the Muslim minority as
a whole in postcolonial India, so a diffuse array of debates over Indian
Muslim leadership and representation have increasingly come to be
expressed through arguments over issues related to personal laws.
MPL has thereby come to appear less as an issue pitting a Muslim
‘community’ against outside others, but has evolved into a key site of
debate between alternative Muslim actors and representatives, and
a key source of anxiety and rupture itself. As indicated above, even
debates taking place between religious schools within Islam have come
to orient largely around questions of which religious laws should apply
to Muslim individuals, and how Muslim families should be regulated
and controlled.
We could conclude from these apparent divisions around the issue of
MPL the vacuity of the twin fictions of the existence of a homogenous
Indian Muslim ‘community,’ and of a singular shari‘at around which
all Muslims can unite. These two falsehoods have been consistently
encouraged both by the state’s abstraction of its Muslim minority,
equating the ‘Muslim’ interest with personal laws, and of course by
the AIMPLB itself, which has predicated its existence on this very
same basis. Such an argument would suggest that the implosion of the
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AIMPLB was in some sense preordained from the time of its
foundation. However, the swiftness of its fragmentation, together with
the recent acrimony of the debates between itself and numerous coun-
terpart legal organisations, suggest that it is worth considering further
some of the numerous factors informing these modern contestations.
Some observers have related the recent decline of the AIMPLB
and corresponding emergence of these numerous alternative personal
law councils to the uniquely fractious and volatile nature of twenty-
first century politics in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where the AIMPLB’s
support base is mainly located. It has often been remarked, for
instance, that many of the key advocates of the Shia Personal Law
Board were close to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP). A prominent Shia cleric opposed to the formation of the
organisation described an alleged ‘saffron conspiracy,’ implying that
certain Shia clerics attached to the BJP had been encouraged to create
a separate Personal Law Board in order to split the Muslim ‘vote-
bank.’64 In addition, the BJP’s vocal rile against the treatment of
Imrana, comparable with its response to the Shah Bano case 20 years
earlier, elevated a specific local issue to a level of national and symbolic
prominence and revealed the political capital to be made from the
allegation that MPL was to blame for endemic misogyny.
Other observers have argued that the formation of parallel law
boards was a means by which certain of their members were able to
seek personal empowerment against the stranglehold of a perceived
clerical establishment. The formation of the Barelvi Law Board, for
example, certainly enhanced the stature of the clerics who founded it,
who were perhaps themselves encouraged by the increasing activity of
other Barelvi-leaning religious organisations such as Mumbai’s Raza
Academy. The formation of the Shia Personal Law Board, moreover,
is perhaps explained not so much through united Shia opposition
to the AIMPLB, but through pre-existing struggles for ascendancy
within the complex Shia clerical order. The main founders of the Shia
Personal Law Board, Mirza Muhammad Athar among them, were a
group of ‘ulama of relatively recent ascendancy. Their motives were
in part inspired by their ambitions to assert themselves against the
long-established Khandan-i-Ijtihad clerical family of Lucknow, which
had held authority over many of the city’s Shia religious institutions
for over 200 years. In recent times, representatives of this family
64 The Pioneer, 25 February, 2005.
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have been closely attached to the AIMPLB and have commanded
a strong role within it.65 As such, clerics attempting to undercut
this family’s hegemony found the alternative Shia Board an efficient
mechanism for doing so; it was even reported that pamphlets defaming
members of this family were being circulated at the time of the new
Board’s foundation.66 Furthermore, it was widely argued in 2005 that
this competition for influence and supremacy between different Shia
factions within Lucknow was translating into sectarian violence, with
each side aggressively rallying their own supporters. One imam of the
city even vividly described the Shia-Sunni riots as ‘a sequel to the
internal strife among the Shia Ulema’ following the foundation of
the Shia Personal Law Board.67 The alleged separation of Shias from
the AIMPLB, then, illustrates how inner-Shia and Shia-Sunni conflicts
could be deeply intertwined.
However, the multi-polar and decentred nature of the many
arguments described in this paper implies that we may need to look
beyond individual instances of personal or political competition to
understand the fragmentation of the AIMPLB. Instead, the scale
and speed of its recent dismemberment suggests that it needs to
be understood within the parameters of those wider and transitional
‘churning processes’ in matters of Muslim leadership and influence in
twenty-first century India alluded to at the beginning of this paper.
We could broadly relate the AIMPLB’s deterioration to what has
been referred to as the ‘fragmentation of religious authority’ in
Muslim societies, on account of the impact of various facets of
modernity. By this interpretation, a number of developments such
as the expansion of education, the widening of public access to new
technologies of communication, and the questioning of traditional
sources of religious expertise, have encouraged a far wider array
of voices to seek participation in debates in the modern public
sphere from which they would previously have been excluded.68 The
65 This family included the mujtahid Sayyid Ali Naqi (d. 1988), and his successor
Kalbe Sadiq, currently a Vice-President of the AIMPLB, who has been closely involved
with the organisation for some 15 years.
66 The Pioneer, 25 February, 2005.
67 The Hindustan Times (Lucknow), 22 February, 2005. On the divisions erupting
among the Shia clergy on account of the formation of the Shia Personal Law Board,
and the political undertones associated with the divisions, see The Indian Express, 25
and 31 January, 2005; The Pioneer, 26 and 31 January, 2005; The Hindustan Times, 25,
30 and 31 January, 2005.
68 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton,
1996), pp. 68–79, 131–35; c.f. Vatuk, ‘Islamic Feminism in India’ (2008): 514–516.
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events described above all demonstrate that a multitude of freshly
empowered actors have for these reasons recently sought to voice
opinion on questions of MPL. They have all newly asserted their
own rights to interpret Islamic scriptures, form shari‘at councils and
formulate legal decisions, refuting the right of a restricted clique
of established ‘ulama to hold singular jurisdiction over such matters.
Islamic feminist organisations, no doubt inspired by liberal discourses
of women’s rights as well as the expansion of women’s education, have
begun to look to the Qur‘an themselves, effectively giving themselves
the right to conduct their own interpretation of the sacred text (often
known as ijtihad) in open defiance of what they consider the inflexible
hadis scholarship of the AIMPLB. Meanwhile, certain Barelvi and Shia
‘ulama havemade use of their dynamism, public popularity and relative
detachment from established clerical hierarchies to challenge their
older and more aloof predecessors.
The opening up of debate on MPL, and the emergence of more
voices trying to speak on it, are therefore indicative of a deep
turbulence in religious authority in contemporary India brought about
by a combination of changing channels of communication, exposure
to dialogues of women’s rights, generational shifts and political
turbulence. At the same time, these debates have given rise to a series
of surprising alliances. Conservative ‘ulama of an array of religious
affiliations, including Shias, Barelvi Sunnis and the Ahl-i-Hadis,69
better known in other contexts for their acrimonious debates over
particular points of Islamic history or practice, have been united
in their criticism of the AIMPLB. The fact that all have launched
their criticisms almost simultaneously suggests some form of direct or
indirect cooperation between these notionally polarised participants
in the debate.70
At the same time, the fact that such clerical groups have largely con-
demned theAIMPLB in a ‘liberal’ discourse of women’s rights reveals a
perhaps surprising coalescence of rhetoric among an unlikely mixture
of established Muslim clergy, women’s activists, arch-secularists and
Hindu communalists. The overall impression is one of considerable
fluidity between religious, sectarian, feminist, secular, political and
69 The Ahl-i-Hadis have long held, and reiterated in recent years, the view that
talaq cannot be said three times on the same occasion, contradicting the AIMPLB’s
understanding. For example, Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation (1997), p. 313.
70 There were, for instance, occasional hints that the Barelvi and Shia Personal Law
Boards even cooperated in their foundation and coordinated their activities. Raport:
Aal Indiya Shia Parsanal Laa Bord, p. 2.
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communal lines of debate on MPL, quite in contrast to the clear-cut
boundaries within which such issues have often been analysed.
Equally, this paper demonstrates that debates on questions of MPL
are not confined to the courtrooms, public forums and newspaper
columns which have dominated scholarly analysis. It instead evokes
a manifold series of unconnected and fragmentary arguments on
personal law issues occurring at various societal and political levels,
and in the diverse set of arenas discussed at the beginning of this
paper, including women’s counselling groups in Mumbai, Shia-Sunni
quarrels in the neighbourhoods of Lucknow, or local machinations
in the panchayats of small Muslim townships. This may make a case
for further more localised and experiential studies of debates on the
workings of MPL, assessing the part it plays in local formations of
Muslim leadership and clerical influence, below the elevated political
and constitutional levels towards which academic literature on the
subject has so often been focused.71
If the contestations described above reflect a number of modern
processes of flux and transition in religious and legal authority
in Indian Islam, then one can only assume a continuation of this
uneasy atmosphere ofmutual antagonism. Responding to internal and
external pressures, the AIMPLB has continued to modify its structure
and commands and, since 2005, has even taken the decision from
which it had previously shied of outlawing the practice of triple-talaq.72
This has, however, seemingly done little to reverse its organisational
fragmentation, and the hostility shown to it by the selection of new
Muslim legal councils described in this paper. At the same time, all
of these alternative Personal Law Boards have continued to exist into
the present, though without full success in attaining the consensual
support of their respective communities or in convincing them to
separate entirely from the AIMPLB. One might anticipate, then, the
perpetuation of this churning process among Muslim leaders, schools
and organisations in contemporary India, with little sign of imminent
resolution.
71 C.f. Patricia Jeffery, ‘A “Uniform Customary Code”? Marital Breakdown and
Women’s Entitlements in Rural Bijnor’, in Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Divorce and Remarriage
Among Muslims in India (New Delhi, 2003) p. 104.
72 The Telegraph, 3May, 2005.
